SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN THIRD CIRCUIT LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent Third Circuit cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we
hope to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more
interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-TAX REFUND INTERCEPT PROGRAM DOES NOT MANDATE PAYMENT OF
INTEREST ON INTERCEPTED FUNDS AND SUCH INTEREST WITH-

HOLDING DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A TAKING NOR VIOLATE DUE

PROCEss-Rogers v. Bucks County Domestic Relations Section, 959
F.2d 1268 (3d Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff Patricia Rogers enlisted the assistance of the Bucks
County Domestic Relations Section (BCDRS or defendant) in
collecting unpaid child support from her ex-husband Gregory
Rogers. Rogers v. Bucks County Domestic Relations Section, 959 F.2d at
1271. The Tax Refund Intercept Program (TRIP) is a federal
program, administered in Pennsylvania by the BCDRS, which
permits the interception and application of tax refunds to satisfy
child support obligations. Id. at 1270. Funds seized for the custodial parent are processed according to whether the non-custodial parent's rebate was based upon a joint or single tax return.
When refunds are intercepted from joint returns, as here, disbursement may be suspended for up to six months. Id. (citing 42
U.S.C. § 664(a)(3)(B) (1988)).
Two intercepts were made on plaintiff's behalf and sent to
the BCDRS, for which the State extracted fifty dollars in fees. Id.
at 1271. The intercepted money was stored in a non-interest
bearing account and released to plaintiff four months later. Asserting the unlawful taking of the interest on the intercepted
funds without just compensation, and the violation of substantive
due process, the plaintiff brought an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment holding, among other things, that plaintiff had no
property interest in the intercepted tax refunds. Id. at 1272. On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision. Id. at 1270. The Third Circuit concluded that the applicable legislation could not be interpreted as requiring payment of interest and, furthermore, the
legislation did not establish any property interest in plaintiff
upon which to base a takings claim. Id. at 1274-75. The circuit
court also held that the absence of any property interest in the
funds avoided the possibility of a substantive due process violation. Id. at 1277.
Writing for the court, Judge Cowen began his analysis by
noting that there was no federal or state statutory requirement
1564
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for the collection and distribution of interest on funds seized
under TRIP. Id. at 1272. Upon examination of the TRIP statutes
and regulations, Judge Cowen observed the legislation's silence
as to interest. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6402(c) (1988)). The judge
stated that courts must defer to the reasonable statutory interpretation of the agency charged with implementing TRIP, the Office
of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE), unless there was distinct
legislative authority to the contrary. Id. The Third Circuit observed that the OCSE promulgated a transmittal, its interpretation of the TRIP statute, which provided instruction on the
treatment of collected funds. Id. at 1273. Judge Cowen noted
that the transmittal neither required placing intercepted funds in
interest-bearing accounts, nor in such an event, directed transferring the interest with the funds. Id.
In addition to the transmittal, the court addressed Pennsylvania's regulations for the Domestic Relations Sections administering TRIP. Id. One agency, Judge Cowen related,
recommended that intercepted funds not be held in interestbearing accounts and another advised BCDRS not to disburse
any interest earned. Id. Accordingly, Judge Cowen stated,
neither the TRIP statutes not the regulations required collection
and distribution of interest. Id. at 1274.
Next, the Third Circuit rejected plaintiff's Fourteenth
Amendment challenge, stating that none of the applicable statutes and regulations endowed plaintiff with a recognizable property interest. Id. Judge Cowen also rebuffed plaintiff's common
law argument by positing that plaintiff was not the beneficiary of
a trust, but was merely dependent upon the TRIP program. Id.
Similarly, the judge dismissed the contention by plaintiff that
it was a creditor of defendant, and that such status created in
plaintiff a property interest in the monies. Id. at 1275 The court
recognized that plaintiff was the recipient of a judgment; it
stressed, however, that the judgment was against Gregory Rogers, not BCDRS. Id. Judge Cowen reasoned that, at all times,
plaintiff maintained a right of recourse against her ex-husband,
the person obligated to pay support and interest on the obligation. Id. The judge noted that the government was facilitating a
service, not disbursing benefits. Id.
Despite its determination that a takings analysis was- inapposite because plaintiff had not established a recognizable property
interest, the circuit court nonetheless reviewed the United States
Supreme Court's pronouncements on regulatory takings. Id.
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The circuit court set forth the three factors the Supreme Court
looked to in the regulatory takings arena: 1) the economic consequences to the plaintiff; 2) the degree of interference the regulation had on "investment-backed expectations;" and 3) the nature
of the regulation. Id. (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). After application of each part,
the circuit court found that plaintiff failed under all three. Id.
The court determined that the economic impact to plaintiff
would have approximated $200, a relatively low figure; that the
plaintiff had no financial investment; and that the defendant
earned no interest on plaintiff's funds. Id. at 1275-76.
The Third Circuit acknowledged prior holdings in which interest was held to be a protectable property interest. Id. at 1276
(citing Bennett v, White, 865 F.2d 1395 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied 492
U.S. 920 (1989); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449
U.S. 155 (1980)). Judge Cowen emphasized, however, that the
prior holdings were distinguishable because interception and
eventual payment of the monies in the instant case were in strict
accordance with applicable law. Id. The case at bar was further
distinguishable from previous holdings because the defendant
had valid justifications for not requiring interest on intercepted
funds. Id. at 1277.
The Third Circuit then briefly turned to plaintiff's substantive due process claim. Id. The court first pointed out that it had
previously found absent any recognizable property interest in
plaintiff. Id. Accordingly, the court stated, there necessarily occurred no violation of substantive due process. Id.
The Rogers decision properly noted that the TRIP statutes
and their regulations were silent as to payment of interest, and
appropriately deferred to the interpretation of the government
agency authorized to implement TRIP. Therefore, by noting that
neither the relevant statutes nor regulations mandated payment
of interest, the court accurately rejected plaintiff's due process
claims.
The court, however, made an artificial distinction between
its reasoning that the government simply provided a service and
plaintiff's argument that the government was disbursing benefits.
See id. at 1274-75. TRIP funds collected for AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) families are automatically used to
reimburse the state for benefits allocated through the AFDC program. Thus, the state considers funds collected under AFDC and
TRIP to be of the same character, otherwise it would not use
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them interchangeably. Even though the court overlooked the
subtleties in the state's treatment of TRIP funds, its disposition
of plaintiff's resemblance to a judgment-creditor was correct.
This may be semantic hairsplitting, but the quality of the government's actions were more of service than of benefit; still, the
court should note that plaintiff's contention was not so obtuse.
Steven C. Mannion

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-FIRST

AMENDMENT-PUBLIC

Li-

BRARY MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY DENY ACCESS TO PATRONS ON

THE BASIS OF PERSONAL HYGIENE-Kreimer v. Morristown, 958

F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992).
Respondents Morristown and Morris Township created the
Joint Free Public Library of Morristown and Morris Township
(Library) pursuant to a state statute that permitted, but did not
require, the municipalities to establish and support a free public
library. 958 F.2d at 1246 (citing NJ. STAT. ANN. § 40:54-29.3
(West 1991)). Despite the existence of a state statute that
granted the Board of Trustees of the Library (Board) the authority to enact written regulations that would "carry out the purposes of the joint library," the Library operated under unwritten
procedures and rules until May 1989. At that time, the Board
decided to adopt written rules that regulated, inter alia, loitering,
noise, staring, talking to oneself, personal hygiene and dress. Id.
at 1247. The rules authorized library employees to evict nonconforming patrons and also empowered the Board to deny access to any patron who consistently violated the rules.

Appellant Richard Kreimer, a homeless man who lived in
various outdoor portions of Morristown, frequently visited the
Library, both before and after the enactment of the rules, where
he claimed to enjoy reading and resting in silent contemplation.
Id. at 1246. After the Board enacted the rules, Library officials
twice expelled Kreimer for loitering and maintaining inappropri-

ate personal hygiene and dress. Id. at 1247.
Following the expulsions, the ACLU wrote to the Library
and asserted that several provisions of the rules violated the
United States and New Jersey Constitutions because they were
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vague and invested too much discretion in Library officials. Id. at
1247-48. The Board thereafter modified the rules to include
some specificity, but did not eliminate the discretionary powers
afforded to the Library officials. Id. at 1248. Using the modified
rules, Library officials again expelled Kreimer from the Library
for non-compliance.
In response, Kreimer filed a complaint pro se against numerous defendants alleging various constitutional and statutory violations stemming from his expulsion. Id. at 1248-49. After
Kreimer amended his complaint several times, the district court
appointed counsel. Id. at 1249. The defendants responded with
a counterclaim seeking to restrain and enjoin Kreimer, pursuant
to Library Rules, from harassing employees and patrons in and
about the Library premises. Id. On cross-motions for summary
judgment, the district court found the rules unconstitutional and
enjoined the Library from enforcing the provisions. Id. at 1250.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and ordered the district court to enter partial summary judgment for the defendants. Id. at 1270.
Writing for the appeals panel, Judge Greenberg began by
recognizing that Kreimer had a First Amendment right to receive
information and ideas. Id. at 1251. Following a lengthy review of
United States Supreme Court decisions, Judge Greenberg acknowledged that the Constitution mandates some level of access
to public libraries because public libraries are the "quintessential
locus of the receipt of information." Id. (citing Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)). The appellate judge nonetheless
concluded that this First Amendment right can be limited by
rules that are narrowly drafted to effectuate a significant governmental interest. Id. at 1251-55 (citing Board of Education v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853 (1982)).
As a threshold issue, the court addressed whether the Library constituted a quintessential public forum, a designated
public forum or a non-public forum. Id. at 1255. Describing a
quintessential public forum, the panel found that the Court has
usually reserved that distinction for areas such as public parks,
sidewalks, and streets. Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass 'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). To regulate speech
content in a quintessential public forum, Judge Greenberg noted
that the government must prove a compelling state interest, that
the restrictive regulation is narrowly drawn to meet the govern-

19921

SURVEY

1569

ment's interest and that adequate alternate channels of communication remain open. Id. (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 45)).
The court then turned its attention to designated public forums. Id. at 1255-56. Judge Greenberg initially defined such fora
as publicly-owned, non-quintessential places that the government has opened for expressive activity. Id. While noting that
the government is not required to keep such fora open for these
purposes, Judge Greenberg acknowledged that any restrictions
on First Amendment rights in a designated public forum must
meet the same standards applied to quintessential public forums.
Id. at 1256.
Returning to the facts, Judge Greenberg deduced that the
Library was sufficiently dissimilar to a public park, street or sidewalk and, therefore, did not constitute a quintessential public forum. Id. The judge reasoned that public libraries generally do
not permit patrons to make speeches or participate in other traditional First Amendment activities. Id.
Turning to the test for designated public fora, the panel concluded that the Library constituted a limited public forum, which
the court characterized as a category of designated public fora.
Id. at 1258-59 (citations omitted). In reaching this conclusion,
the Court noted that the Library had been voluntarily established
by Morristown and Morris Township. Id. at 1259. Thejudge also
pointed out that, based on the Library rules, the public could
only use the Library for studying and reading and not for all First
Amendment activities. Id. at 1260-61. Judge Greenberg further
recognized that libraries are generally quiet places of study, not
havens for oral or other interactive First Amendment expression.
Id. at 1261. The court concluded that the nature of the Library,
therefore, supported the finding that the Library was a limited
public forum. Id. at 1261-62 (citation omitted).
Having reached this conclusion, the panel noted that any
constitutional protection extended only to the "expressive activity of a genre similar to those that government has admitted to the limited
forum." Id. at 1261 (citing Travis v. Owego-Appalachian School District, 927 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphasis supplied by
Kreimer court)). Therefore, according to the panel, the Library
only had to admit patrons who intended to participate in activities consistent with the government's limited recognition of the
Library as a public forum. Id. at 1262.
The court then specifically examined each rule to determine
if any regulation constituted an improper time, place or manner
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restriction on First Amendment activity and whether the Board
narrowly drafted each rule to match the government's interest.
Id. (citations omitted). First, the court reviewed the regulation
that prohibited activities other than studying, reading or using
library materials (Rule 1). Id. Relying on the district court record, the panel recognized that the Board enacted the rules to
"foster[] a quiet and orderly atmosphere.., conducive to every
patron's exercise of their constitutionally protected interest in receiving and reading written communications." Id. (citing Kreimer
v. Bureau of Policefor the Town of Morristown, 765 F. Supp. 181, 187
(D.N.J. 1991)). Thus, the judge concluded that the rule requiring
all patrons to use the Library only for library purposes was reasonable and valid. Id. Similarly, the panel upheld the rule
prohibiting the harassment or annoyance of other patrons
through staring, boisterous activities, following others, playing
audio equipment loudly, singing, talking or other disturbing activities (Rule 5). Id. at 1262-63. The court found that prohibiting
such activity was the best means of maximizing library use for all
patrons. Id. at 1263.
The court then closely analyzed the rule that excluded from
the Library those patrons whose personal hygiene was so "offensive" as to annoy other persons (Rule 9). Id. at 1263-64. Recognizing that this rule could be used to expel patrons who used the
Library for permissible First Amendment activities, the panel examined the rule to see if it was narrowly drafted to meet the government's interest. Id. at 1264. The court first reasoned that the
rule need not be the least-restrictive measure nor least-intrusive
means available. Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S.
Ct. 2746, 2757 (1989)). Rather, the panel posited, the regulation
would pass constitutional scrutiny if it advanced a significant government interest that would not be achieved as effectively without the regulation. Id. Returning to the facts, Judge Greenberg
concluded that the rule was permissible because it prohibited
certain persons from interfering with other patrons' Library enjoyment by virtue of poor hygiene. Id.
Lastly, the court found that alternate methods of communication remained open because Library officials permitted access
to all patrons who complied with the rules. Id. Further, because
the rules did not contain language reflecting any right to permanently ban disruptive patrons, the court inferred that any excluded patron who subsequently complied with the rules would
be re-admitted. Id. In summation, the court concluded that the

1992]

SURVEY

1571

rules were narrowly tailored and left open alternate channels of
communication. Id. Because the challenge to the rules was facial,
the court was not concerned whether the rules disproportionately affected homeless people. Id. Further, the panel would not
extend Kreimer's right to Library access-if such a right existed-to the point that his access functionally denied the same
right to others. Id. at 1264-65.
Judge Greenberg then quickly dismissed Kreimer's overbreadth challenge. Id. at 1265-66. While specifically conceding
that the rules may prohibit a silent protest in the Library, the
panel did not "believe" that this or any other hypothetical situation would pose a reasonable or substantial danger that the regulations would injure parties not before the court. Id. Therefore,
the court concluded that the rules did not violate constitutional
overbreadth protections. Id.
The court also rejected Kreimer's final argument, which focused on the regulations' vague language. Id. Examining three of
the rules individually, the court recognized that the standard for
overturning a rule on vagueness standards is less stringent for
civil rules than it is for criminal statutes. Id. at 1267 (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99
(1982)). Applying that principle, the court began by reviewing
Rule 1. Id. Quoting from the oral argument before the district
court, the panel concluded that the Library's interpretation of the
rules dispelled fears that it would use the rules to discriminate
against any particular individuals. Id. (citations omitted). The
court strengthened this conclusion by noting that repeated failure to use the Library for library purposes would be necessary
before a patron would be forced to leave. Id. Additionally, the
court discounted the notion that the discretion granted to the
Library officials was impermissibly vague. Id. at 1267-68.
Turning to Rule 5, the court focused its attention on the
word "annoyance" that was used several times in the rule. Id. at
1268. Finding that Rule 5 contained a list of "annoying" behavior, the panel determined that it was not open to a subjective
interpretation and, therefore, did not violate the vagueness doctrine. Id. The court further recognized that, with regard to the
portion of the rule that prohibited staring at another with the
intent to annoy, the rule focused on the intent of the unruly patron, not the patron to whom the action was being directed. Id.
Therefore, the panel concluded that traditional vagueness concerns about the word "annoy" were obviated in this case. Id.
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Lastly, the court looked at Rule 9 to see if the lack of identifiable standards caused the "personal hygiene" regulation to be
impermissibly vague. Id. Focusing on the word "nuisance," the
court admitted that the word was subject to numerous interpretations. Id. The court quickly qualified that concern by remarking
that a narrow definition that would accurately reflect the Library's interest was impossible to draft. Id. Because the Library
applied a reasonableness test in determining whether a particular
patron constituted a nuisance and because the word "nuisance"
was clearly defined by New Jersey law, the court held that the
language in Rule 9 was not unconstitutionally vague. Id.
The court concluded its review by dismissing Kreimer's assertions that the rules violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution and several provisions of the New
Jersey Constitution. Id. at 1268-70. Therefore, the panel reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case
for the lower court to enter partial summary judgment in favor of
the Library. Id. at 1270.
The real irony in this case is that taxpayer dollars were spent
to keep a homeless man out of a public building rather than on
finding him a place to live. Aside from this dubious allocation of
state resources, the court recognized the constitutional right to
receive information and that public libraries were the quintessential location for receipt of the written word. Based on this right,
the Third Circuit's labeling of the Library as a designated public
forum is irrelevant because the constitutional analysis is the same
as that for quintessential forums. Under that analysis, the Library had to prove that ample alternate channels of communication remained open to Kreimer.
The panel reasoned that alternate channels of communication are open to ejected patrons who clean up their act (so to
speak). While this argument may work for the rules regarding
excessive noise, staring, following other patrons, etc., it fails
when used with regard to the bodily hygiene rule. The rules regarding noise, etc., govern patron conduct-actions within the
control of Library patrons. The personal hygiene rule, however,
is aimed at status, not conduct, and the "clean up" rule does not
provide adequate alternate channels of communication. Rather,
it is analogous to telling someone whose speech is regulated for
its content to "change the content and then you will be given the
opportunity to speak."
Homeless people do not have the opportunities to maintain
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bodily hygiene that other residents enjoy. Unless their socio-economic conditions change, they will never be able to gain access to
the information contained in the Library. For Morristown's
homeless, there are no alternate channels of receiving the information that they have a constitutional right to receive. Therefore, the bodily hygiene rule should have failed constitutional
scrutiny for lack of meaningful alternative channels of
communication.
The Kreimer decision also presents some interesting questions on remand. First, the amended rules removed the "community standards" element from the regulation governing
personal hygiene and, as the court noted, replaced it with a reasonableness standard. See id. at 1268. The reasonableness standard considers what a reasonable person would be expected to
do in the circumstances. A jury's thought process would necessarily translate this requirement into an examination of what the
reasonable person in the local community would do. In Morristown's sub-community of homeless persons, the reasonable person would necessarily have different hygienic standards from
some of the other persons living in the Morristown community.
On remand, the district court should consider whether a reasonable person in Morristown-including its homeless sub-community-would consider Kreimer a nuisance when he visits the
Library.
Second, the court did not address whether the regulations
worked a discriminatory hardship on the homeless. While the
conduct-based regulations should pass this constitutional challenge, the personal hygiene element necessarily fails. While the
homeless should not be considered a protected class in the nature of race or national origin, they should be entitled to middletier scrutiny. Because discriminatory effects based on economic
factors are usually afforded rational basis scrutiny, however, it is
unlikely that the district court will invoke middle tier scrutiny on
remand. But even under the rational basis standard, the regulations should fail because the personal hygiene rule clearly effects
a discriminatory impact on the homeless. Very few, if any, homeless can meet the cleanliness standard, while virtually no one with
access to bathing facilities will be forced to leave the premises
under the hygiene rule. Therefore, even though the Library
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rules may be considered valid on their face, the district court on
remand should declare the effects of those rules unconstitutional.
Mark J. Oberstaedt

PROPERTY-VIRGIN

ISLANDS'

TENANT

CAN

RECOVER

CONSE-

QUENTIAL DAMAGES FOR LANDLORD'S REPEATED VIOLATION OF
EITHER LOCAL HOUSING CODES OR IMPLIED WARRANTY OF

HABITABILITY-Miller

v. Christian, 958 F.2d 1234 (3d Cir.

1992).
Plaintiff Melita Miller (Miller) rented a two-bedroom, one
bathroom apartment from defendant landlord Allan A. Christian
(Christian). 958 F.2d at 1236. Miller was a month-to-month tenant and there was no written lease. On several occasions, raw
sewage had backed up into Miller's bathtub. Christian was aware
of the problem and had it temporarily repaired. On August 2,
1989, Miller's bathtub again filled with sewage and Miller notified
Christian. Christian could not immediately find a plumber and,
as a result, the problem was not corrected until August 4th. In
the meantime, the sewage spilled over into an adjoining bedroom
where it damaged some clothing, linens and bedding.
Miller filed suit in the small claims division of the Territorial
Court of the Virgin Islands asking for $450 for the damage to her
personal property. Id. The territorial court, in a bench trial, held
Christian liable for the damage to Miller's personal property
even though his efforts to remedy the immediate problem were
reasonable. Id. The Appellate Division of the District Court of
the Virgin Islands and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed the territorial court's decision. Id.
Judge Hutchinson, writing for the Third Circuit, began his
analysis by focusing on the duties of a landlord to a tenant under
Virgin Islands law. Id. at 1237. The judge first asserted that
Christian would be held to the same duty all landlords owe their
tenants, even in the absence of a written lease. Id. The court then
noted that Christian gave no legal support for his contention that
Virgin Islands law required landlord liability to be predicated on
a finding of statutory violation, breach of contract or negligence.
Id. Judge Hutchinson explained that, in the absence of guiding
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local law or precedent, the court would look first to the common
law as interpreted through the Restatement of Property. Id. (cit-

ing V.I.

CODE ANN.

tit.

1, § 4 (1984)). Alternatively, the judge

remarked, where the Restatement was silent, the court would
choose what it believed to be the sounder rule. Id. (citing Polius v.
Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 77 (3d Cir. 1986); Vidal v. Virgin
Islands Housing Auth., 20 V.I. 3, 4 (Terr. Ct. 1983)).
Looking to the Restatement of Property, Judge Hutchinson
first noted that a landlord must maintain his property in accordance with governing health, safety and housing codes. Id. at

1237-38 (citing

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF PROPERTY

§ 5.5(1)

(1977)). Next, the court looked to the implied warranty of habitability, which required a landlord to keep the property in a man-

ner fit for human habitation. Id. at 1238 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.5 (1977)). Applying these principles,
the Third Circuit concluded that the condition of the apartment,
as revealed by the evidence, did not meet these requirements. Id.
Continuing his analysis, Judge Hutchinson observed that
Virgin Islands law placed the care of an apartment's sewage sys-

tem in the hands of the landlord. Id. (citing V.I.

CODE ANN. tit.

29, § 333(b) (1976)). The court believed the evidence sufficiently
established that Christian knew of the recurrent sewage problem.
Id. Consequently, the judge found that Christian's efforts to permanently eradicate the problem were inadequate. Id. Further,
the judge pointed out, the sanitation inspector had informed
Christian that the apartment was in a "deplorable" condition. Id.
Therefore, the court asserted, by allowing the sewage problem to
continue, Christian breached the implied warranty of habitability.
Id.
Turning to the issue of recovery, the Third Circuit noted
that Section 5.5 of the Restatement of Property did not offer a
remedy for damages to a tenant's personal property. Id. (citing
RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

PROPERTY

§ 5.5 (1977)).

Judge

Hutchinson observed that the implied warranty of habitability
normally applies as an affirmative defense for a tenant's failure to
pay rent. Id. (citing Conille v. Secretary of HUD, 840 F.2d 105, 111
(1st Cir. 1988); Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071,
1082 (D.C. Cir. 1970)). Thus, Judge Hutchinson reasoned, the
applicable laws limited a tenant's remedies. Id.
Judge Hutchinson stated that Section 5.4 of the Restatement
allowed for the recovery of damages in accordance with Section

10.2. Id. at 1238-39 (citing

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
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§ 5.4 (1977)). Section 10.2, the court further explained, made
no mention of recovery for damages to personal property. Id. at
1239 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 10.2 (1977)).
Instead, the court commented, section 10.2 limited a tenant's recovery to costs for repair, relocation or termination of the lease.
Id. The judge acknowledged that the common law recognized an
affirmative cause of action for the breach of the implied warranty
of habitability. Id. (citing George Washington Univ. v. Weintraub, 458
A.2d 43, 46-48 (D.C. 1983); Old Town Dev. Co. v. Lang/ord, 349
N.E.2d 744 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977), superseded by 369 N.E.2d 404
(Ind. 1977)). Nevertheless, the court concluded that because
Section 10.2 was silent on the issue of consequential damages,
Miller could not recover under this theory. Id. at 1240.
The Third Circuit then examined tort liability as a possible
remedy. Id. Initially, the judge looked to Section 17.6 of the Restatement of Property, which addressed a landlord's duties and
liabilities in relation to a "dangerous condition". Id. (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF PROPERTY §

17.6 (1977)). The court

observed that Section 17.6 imposed liability on a landlord for
"physical harm" whenever the landlord had not exercised reasonable care to repair a dangerous condition and was in violation
of either the implied warranty of habitability or local statutes or
ordinances. Id. The court examined the Restatement of Torts for
a definition of "physical harm". Id. Judge Hutchinson interpreted "physical harm" as defined under Section 7(3) of the Restatement of Torts, to encompass harm to persons, land and
chattels. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(3)
(1965)). Thus, the court asserted, Section 17.6 and general negligence principles offered a viable theory of recovery for personal
property damages. Id. (citations omitted).
Discussing negligence principles, the judge observed that according to section 17.6 a landlord's violation of local statute or
ordinance could qualify as negligence per se. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 17.6 cmt. a (1977)). The court further noted that by analogy to the negligence per se doctrine, a
landlord could be held liable for physical harm for the breach of
the implied warranty of habitability. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 17.6 cmt. a (1977)). The court reiterated its finding that Christian had breached the implied warranty
of habitability and violated his statutory duty to maintain the sewage system. Id. Thus, the panel concluded that the problem was a
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"dangerous condition" as mandated by Section 17.6 of the Restatement of Property. Id. at 1240-41.
Finally, the court turned to Christian's claim that the territorial court's finding that he acted reasonably to correct the sewage
problem on August 2nd precluded a judgment against him. Id. at
1241. Judge Hutchinson agreed that Section 17.6 held a landlord liable only if he or she failed to take "reasonable care" to
repair the dangerous condition. Id. The judge declared, however, that Christian's attempts to contact a plumber each time the
sewage backed up were not necessarily indicative of his reasonableness in correcting the persistent problem. Id. The court concluded that Christian's failure to correct the recurrent problem
was a breach of both the implied warranty of habitability and local housing codes. Id. (citations omitted). The court added that
the evidence was sufficient to allow the territorial court to grant
Miller damages for injury to her personal property and affirmed
the damages award. Id.
The Third Circuit's decision properly grants Miller the consequential damages resulting from Christian's default. The court,
however, awards the damages under the auspices of tort, refusing
to embrace theories of contract recovery that have become quite
commonplace in the property law arena. Surprisingly, the court
relies on the Restatement of Property for most of its analysis, yet
fails to note that the Restatement incorporates contractual remedies. Section 5.5, comment 6 states that there is a tendency
among courts to view the implied warranty of habitability and a
tenant's obligation to pay rent as interdependent, thus adopting
a contractual mutuality of obligations stance. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.5 cmt. 6 (1977). In addition, Section
5.4, comment k holds a landlord liable for the damages a tenant
incurred while an "unsuitable condition" existed, if the condition
is the fault of the landlord, and regardless of whether the landlord corrected the condition within a reasonable time. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.4 cmt. k (1977).
Finally,
Section 10.2, the section the court interpreted as denying contractual relief, tacitly approves of contractual remedies. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 10.2 rpts. n. 2, 12 (1977)
(acknowledging the fact that courts are inclined to award contractual-type remedies for a landlord's default).
Modern leases are more akin to contracts than to conveyances of land. For this reason, landlord-tenant law has become
progressively more contract-oriented. The Miller court, there-
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fore, has taken a step backwards in failing to accept contract remedies and relying instead on tort. While the outcome is the same,
i.e., Miller recovers personal property damages, the drawback is
-the effect of this decision on lower courts. In the arena of landlord-tenant law, this decision may force the lower courts to fashion a superficial recovery in tort rather than the more practical
and efficient remedies in contract. In an age where the law is
grappling with slum landlords and a shortage of adequate housing, imposing contractual duties, with accompanying contractual
remedies, on the parties to a lease seems necessary to encourage
the fulfillment of landlord-tenant obligations.
Maureen O'Brien
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To JUSTIFY BARS A DEBTOR'S DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS CLAIM-Meridian Bank v. Alten, 958
F.2d 1126 (3d Cir. 1992).
DEBTOR

AND

FAILURE

Following default on a loan personally guaranteed by Eugene and Marlene Alten, Meridian Bank obtained a judgment
against the Altens for $3,836,181. 958 F.2d at 1228. To protect
their assets from creditors and avoid payment of the Meridian
judgment, the Altens dealt only with cash or money orders and
refused to maintain records of their personal and business transactions. The Altens filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code (the Code) in an effort to discharge the Meridian debt. Meridian challenged the discharge, alleging that the Altens concealed their assets, failed to maintain financial records in
accordance with the Code and made false claims with regard to
their financial matters.
Rejecting Meridian's argument, the bankruptcy court
granted a discharge of indebtedness to the Altens. The court
reasoned that the Altens' fears of liens being levied against their
accounts by creditors, in conjunction with the sporadic nature of
Mr. Alten's business, justified the Altens' failure to maintain business records. Id. at 1128-29. The district court reversed the ruling of the bankruptcy court and revoked the Altens' discharge of
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indebtedness, declaring that the bankruptcy court incorrectly applied 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3) of the Code which permits a court to
deny a discharge of indebtedness when the debtor justifies his/
her failure to maintain business records. Id. at 1229.
Affirming the district court's holding, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that the Altens were not justified in failing to keep and preserve adequate
financial records. Id. at 1332. The Third Circuit reasoned that
the sporadic nature of the Altens' business did not justify the failure to maintain business records and, consequently, the Altens
failed to satisfy their burden of persuasion on the issue of justification. Id.
Writing for the court, Judge Cowen initially addressed the
purpose underlying § 727(a)(3) of the Code. Id. at 1230. Judge
Cowen stated that the legislature enacted § 727(a)(3) to ensure
full disclosure of the debtor's financial status. Id. This statutory
requirement affords trustees and creditors with a reliable source
of information with which a debtor's financial history may be
traced, the judge explained. Id. The judge stressed that, while
the sufficiency of a debtor's record keeping varies according to
the facts of each case, it is unquestioned that full disclosure of a
debtor's financial status is required. Id. Recognizing that the
failure to maintain financial records may be justified, the judge
emphasized that a complete and accurate disclosure of financial
affairs is required prior to a grant of discharge. Id. The test for
adequacy, the judge stated, requires that the debtor's past and
present financial affairs are able to be ascertained from some
written evidence. Id. (citing In re Decker, 595 F.2d 185, 187 (3d
Cir. 1979)).
Recognizing that the failure to maintain written records
must be justified, the court thereafter addressed what circumstances justify the failure to keep and preserve business records.
Id. at 1230-31. The judge initially noted that the Bankruptcy
Code does not define what constitutes a valid justification. Id. at
1231. Judge Cowen explained that the trier of fact must determine whether justification exists by considering the totality of the
circumstances and the actions expected from a reasonable person in that situation. Id. (citing In re Wilson, 33 B.R. 689, 692
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983). The judge declared that the debtor's
education, experience and sophistication are all relevant variables to be examined, and asserted that sophisticated persons are
generally held to a higher standard of accountability. Id. Judge
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Cowen also declared that that Mr. Alten's sophistication, business experience and legal knowledge imposed upon him a
heightened accountability regarding record keeping. Id. at 123132.
The court summarily dismissed Alten's assertion that his failure to maintain business records was justified by his small legal
practice. Id. at 1232. Judge Cowen reasoned that the size of the
business or practice does not alleviate the burden to keep adequate records. Id. The court further noted that Mr. Alten was
required to keep and preserve adequate records not because he
was an attorney but because he sought to have his debt discharged under the Bankruptcy Code. Id. As such, the judge
stated, the Code requires debtors to keep and preserve adequate
business records and, in the absence of the required records, Mr.
Alten cannot enjoy the benefits of the code's discharge provision.
Id.
Noting the apparent lack of justification for the Altens' failure to maintain financial records, the judge acknowledged that
the debtor bears the burden to establish justification. Id. at 1233.
The Third Circuit explained that, initially, the burden of persuasion rests with the creditor to establish the inadequacy of the
debtor's financial records. Id. Thereafter, the judge stated, the
burden shifts to the debtor to justify his/her failure to maintain
adequate records. Id. The judge further acknowledged that this
burden properly lies with the debtor since such information is
solely within that party's possession. Id. at 1233-34 (citing Bankruptcy Rule 4005).
Applying these principles, Judge Cowen held that the Altens'
fear of liens being levied against their assets, without more, was
inadequate to justify their failure to maintain financial records.
Id. at 1234. Consequently, the court reasoned that the bankruptcy court misapplied section 727(a)(3) as a matter of law. Id.
More specifically, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court
erroneously placed the burden of persuasion on Meridian to establish that the Altens should not be granted a discharge instead
of applying the plain language of section 727(a)(3). Id. More accurately, the judge explained, the Code requires the debtor to
establish his/her justification in failing to maintain adequate financial records. Id. In closing, the court declared that the purpose of section 727(a)(3) is to require debtors to fully disclose
their financial status prior to being granted a discharge of indebtedness. Id. By offering no proof of justification, the
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judge refused to allow the Altens to defeat the purpose of
section 727(a)(3) and, consequently, denied the discharge of
indebtedness.
In Meridian v. Alten, the court aptly respected the intent underlying section 727(a)(3), to afford creditors full disclosure of a
debtor's financial status. Negligent record keeping invites fraud
and exposes creditors to undue risk. Moreover, the allowance of
inadequate record keeping may discourage lending by potential
creditors due to the significant likelihood of discharge.
The court's failure to define the parameters of justification
leaves an ambiguous and open-ended term that is subject to the
whims of the trier of fact. Perhaps the court could have clearly
enunciated the situations or events that would constitute and justify a debtor from not maintaining or preserving adequate business records. In this way, all interested parties would have full
disclosure of all pertinent information upon which they can make
an informed decision.
ChristopherM. Wilson
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LOUISIANA COUNSEL WHO ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED TORTIOUS

ACTS WITHIN NEW JERSEY--Carteret v.

Shushan, 954 F.2d 141

(3d Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff, Carteret Savings Bank (Carteret), whose principal
place of business is located in New Jersey, extended a construction loan to a Louisiana real estate concern (Borrower). 954 F.2d
at 143. Carteret engaged defendants Louis Shushan and his law
firm as Louisiana local counsel to represent the bank in the negotiation and consummation of the loan transaction. In furtherance
of their duties, the defendants drafted and Carteret executed at
the closing, a "Contractors Consent and Certification." The
Contractors Consent and Certification contained a provision requiring Carteret, upon the Borrower's default, to compensate the
general contractor for any work completed to the date of default
(Consent Provision). The Borrower subsequently filed a bank-
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ruptcy petition thereby defaulting under the Consent Provision.
A Louisiana federal district court then found Carteret liable for
$198,304 to the general contractor under the Consent Provision.
During the course of the Louisiana litigation, Carteret instituted a suit against defendants in the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey. Id. Carteret initially alleged,
among other things, that the defendants breached their fiduciary
duty when, at a meeting in New Jersey prior to the loan closing,
Shushan failed to disclose important information to Carteret. Id.
Specifically, Carteret alleged that Shushan failed to reveal the
existence of the Consent Provision, as well as Carteret's potential
liability thereunder. Id. It was further asserted that the defendants failed to disclose to Carteret their ongoing representation of
the general contractor. Id.
The defendants made a motion to dismiss Carteret's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. Carteret opposed the
motion and, in addition, moved to amend its pleadings for the
purpose of incorporating an intentional tort claim. Id. at 143-44.
Thereafter, defendants motioned to transfer venue under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a). Id. at 144. Over Carteret's objections, the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
granted a change of venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) after
concluding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over defendants.
Id. The district court determined that the defendants lacked the
requisite contacts with the State of New Jersey to establish general jurisdiction, and the loan transaction was insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction. Id.
After consolidating Carteret's petition for writ of mandamus
with its appeal from the transfer order, the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed the latter for
want of appellate jurisdiction. Id. The court of appeals did determine, however, that the Section 1406(a) change of venue was
improperly invoked given Carteret's objections and, therefore,
allowed some relief on the mandamus petition by expunging the
venue order. Id. In addition, the appeals court upheld the finding of the lower court regarding its lack of personal jurisdiction.
Id. On remand the district court, vacated its Section 1406(a)
venue order, denied defendants' Section 1404(a) venue motion,
and granted Carteret's motion to add an averment of intentional
tort to its complaint. Id. The district court also refused to reexamine its original decision regarding lack of personal jurisdiction
under the original complaint. Id. Moreover, subsequent to the
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addition of the intentional tort to Carteret's pleadings, the court
found that it continued to lack personal jurisdiction over the defendants and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. Id.
Reversing the lower court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied a plenary standard of review
and held that the district court possessed personal jurisdiction
over the defendants. Id. at 151. The appeals court determined
that establishment of a prima facie claim of an intentional tort
committed by a non-resident defendant, in the forum state, conferred in personam jurisdiction. Id. Thus, the Third Circuit reversed the trial court's order and remanded for further
proceedings. Id.
Judge Mansmann, writing for the Third Circuit, first looked
to New Jersey's long-arm rule. Id. Recognizing that the longarm rule was co-extensive with the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 145 (citations omitted), the court
concluded that the limits of the rule were those of "fair play and
substantial justice." Id. (citing InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). The court also observed that the
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction by
a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 146. (citing Time Share
Vacation v. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Turning to the case at bar, the Third Circuit examined Carteret's amended complaint, which set forth averments relating to
the claim of intentional tort. Id. The court summarized Carteret's allegations as follows: Shushan intentionally concealed the
defendants' representation of the general contractor, and failed
to disclose the existence and legal ramifications of the Consent
Provision. Id. The court also noted Carteret's assertion that
Shushan's deliberate failure to disclose this information occurred
at a meeting in New Jersey. Id. The trial court concluded that the
facts, when taken together, constituted the intentional tort of
fraudulent misrepresentation. Id.
Having clarified the factual circumstances constituting Carteret's claim, Judge Mansmann articulated the applicable rule of
law. Id. at 146. The judge stated that in personam jurisdiction exists when a non-resident defendant makes a deliberate misrepresentation while in the forum state. Id. Judge Mansmann
reviewed relevant case law and noted that both the Third Circuit
and the New Jersey Supreme Court had adopted this rule. Id. at
146-47. Moreover, the Third Circuit noted that New Jersey's
highest court had actually expanded the boundaries of personal
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jurisdiction. Id. at 147. The court observed that the New Jersey
Supreme Court recently upheld the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a Florida defendant, notwithstanding that the alleged
fraudulent acts of the defendant occurred outside of New Jersey.
Id. (citing Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 115 N.J. 317, 558 A.2d
1252 (1989)). The supreme court concluded that notwithstanding the limited nature of defendant's contacts with New Jersey,
the activities were nonetheless purposefully directed at the forum
state. Id. (citations omitted). Concluding its review of long-arm
rule jurisprudence, the Third Circuit returned to the case sub
judice and found that Shushan's alleged tortious conduct sufficiently established personal jurisdiction. Id.
As additional support for its holding, the court examined the
issue of personal jurisdiction under the "effects test." Id. at 14748. Under the effects test, if a non-resident defendant committed
a tortious act outside of the forum state, which effected a plaintiff
in the forum state, a court of the forum state could exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 148 (citing Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)). Judge Mansmann reasoned that if
due process was not violated when personal jurisdiction was exercised under circumstances where the non-resident defendant
committed tortious acts outside the forum state, then personal
jurisdiction could properly be found when the tortious act occurred within the forum state. Id.
From its discussion of the intentional tort claim, the court
turned to an examination of Carteret's assertion that defendants
breached their fiduciary duty. Id. at 149. The court noted the
differences between specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction.
Id. Recognizing that specific jurisdiction was relevant to circumstances where the defendant had no continuing presence in the
forum state, Judge Mansmann acknowledged that prior to establishing specific jurisdiction the plaintiff had to show that the defendant had the required "minimum contacts" with New Jersey.
Id. (quoting Dollar Sav. Bank v. First Security Bank of Utah, 746 F.2d
208 (3d Cir. 1984)). Applying this rule to the facts, the court
determined that the defendants' telephone calls and correspondence to New Jersey, as well as Shushan's traveling to the state,
constituted sufficient minimum contacts with New Jersey for the
purpose of establishing specific jurisdiction. Id.
Finally, the circuit court recognized the defendants' right to
prove that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be unreasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 150 (quoting Burger King
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Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1986)). The court listed a panoply of issues to be considered when determining the unreasonableness of personal jurisdiction. Id. (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292 (1980)). Finding that
defendants' had failed to meet their burden of proof, the Third
Circuit declared the district court could properly have exercised
personal jurisdiction. Id. at 150-51.
The opinion of the Third Circuit follows the inclination of
the New Jersey Supreme Court to liberally interpret the long-arm
rule. In short, the holding effectively expands the ability of a resident of the forum state to bring suit in a favorable court.
Whether or not intended, a consequence of such a broad reading
is the recognition of the protectionist nature of New Jersey's
long-arm rule. Although the Third Circuit's reading is consistent
with due process, it may provoke retaliatory ramifications. Other
jurisdictions may now be inclined to expansively interpret their
own long-arm statutes.
Sarah W, Miller

